EAST AND WEST

In the quiet hours of early March 31, residents across Estonia awoke to the piercing wail of emergency alerts on their phones. The EE-ALARM system, Estonia’s national hazard notification app, lit up with warnings of an “air threat” near the borders with Russia. Drones—linked to Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive—had entered Estonian airspace, prompting widespread alerts that stretched from the northeast to central and southern regions. By dawn, the all-clear sounded, but the incident was far from isolated. It was the latest chapter in a tense saga playing out along the Gulf of Finland, where Ukrainian long-range drones are hammering Russia’s critical oil export terminals at Ust-Luga and Primorsk, just kilometers from NATO’s eastern flank.cnn.com

This is not abstract geopolitics. Ukraine insists it is targeting the financial arteries of Russia’s war machine. Russia accuses the Baltic states of complicity, claiming Ukrainian drones are overflying their airspace with impunity. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania firmly deny any involvement, attributing the incursions to “stray” Ukrainian drones knocked off course—possibly by Russian electronic warfare. “I have no reason to doubt the official version of the Estonian Ministry of Defense”, says Aleksandr Tšaplõgin, an Estonian MP interviewed by East and West.

Ust-Luga and Primorsk, located in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast on the southern and northern shores of the Gulf of Finland respectively, are no ordinary ports. Together, they handle roughly half of Russia’s seaborne oil exports—millions of barrels of crude and refined products daily, generating billions in revenue that funds Moscow’s military efforts in Ukraine. Primorsk serves as a major outlet for Urals crude via pipelines, while Ust-Luga is one of Russia’s largest overall ports, exporting oil products, coal, and more.

In the final week of March 2026, Ukraine escalated its long-range drone campaign dramatically. Ukrainian forces, including the Security Service (SBU) and military units, launched repeated strikes—Ust-Luga was hit for the fifth time in ten days by March 31 alone. Fires raged at oil loading terminals operated by Transneft, storage tanks ignited, and loading operations ground to a halt for days. Satellite imagery and industry reports confirmed massive plumes of smoke visible even from Finland. Ukrainian officials described the operation as “demilitarizing Russia’s oil arteries,” aimed at crippling export capacity and starving the Kremlin of war funds. Estimates suggest over $1 billion in lost revenues in a single week, with seaborne oil shipments dropping sharply to their lowest levels since the invasion began.

Ukraine’s perspective is clear and unapologetic: These are legitimate military targets deep inside Russia, over 1,000 km from Ukrainian launch points. Long-range drones (some reportedly capable of 900+ km flights) represent Ukraine’s asymmetric response to Russia’s superior conventional forces. Ukraine has not hidden its intent; its General Staff and SBU have publicly confirmed strikes on these Baltic facilities, part of a broader pattern targeting energy infrastructure. For Ukraine and its supporters, the Baltic incidents are unfortunate but predictable side effects of Russia’s defensive countermeasures.

rom Moscow’s viewpoint, the story is one of direct provocation—and potential NATO entanglement. Russian officials and state media have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian drones are not simply “drifting” but are traversing Baltic airspace en route to their targets. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated explicitly on March 31 that if foreign countries allow their airspace to be used for “hostile, terrorist activity” against Russia, Moscow would “draw the appropriate conclusions and take corresponding measures.” Russian Telegram channels and outlets like Rossiya 1 amplified maps purporting to show drone flight paths slicing through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Russia portrays the Baltic states as active participants in a hybrid war, accusing them of opening their skies to Ukrainian operations. Russian air defenses, including electronic warfare (EW) systems, are depicted as successfully intercepting most threats, but any incursions are framed as evidence of Baltic collusion rather than technical failure. For Russia, these events justify heightened vigilance—and potential retaliation—against what it sees as an expanding theater of conflict.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have responded with unequivocal denials, backed by investigations and public statements. Estonian officials, including Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna and Defence Forces spokespeople, insist the drones originated in Russian airspace, entered theirs unintentionally, and were Ukrainian models diverted by Russian electronic warfare—GPS jamming or spoofing that causes navigation errors over long distances. One drone struck the chimney of the Auvere power plant in Ida-Viru County on March 25 with no injuries or major damage; others crashed in fields or were detected without interception. Latvia reported a similar crash in Krāslava; Lithuania saw one near its Belarusian border.

The Baltic governments describe these as “concrete consequences of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression,” not their own actions. They have not opened airspace to anyone for attacks, emphasize no participation in planning or execution, and point to evidence: drone wreckage analysis confirming Ukrainian origin, radar tracks showing entry from Russia, and the physics of long-range flights where minor EW interference can compound into major deviations.

The evidence strongly supports the Baltic and Ukrainian account: Ukrainian strikes on targets, with collateral drone drifts exacerbated by Russian defenses. Russia’s accusations serve deterrence purposes, exploiting the incidents to pressure NATO. Yet both sides acknowledge the danger. Ukraine’s campaign draws the war’s shadow onto NATO borders. Estonia’s alerts are a sobering reminder: civilians in Narva or Tartu are now closer to the front lines than many realize.

Some Russian analysts sound indeed chilling. Stanislav Tkachenko, professor of international relations at Sankt Peterburg State University, commented to East and West: “For the time being, the prevailing view in Russia is that the primary objective is the successful conclusion of the special military operation and the dismantling of the Nazi regime in Ukraine. This is to be followed by a comprehensive diplomatic and economic distancing from Europe. In other words, Russia will in the near future strengthen its anti-missile and air defence capabilities, and develop other means of protecting its port facilities in the North-West, which play a vital role in the export of hydrocarbons and mineral fertilisers. At the same time, Russia will gather intelligence on the defence capabilities of the Baltic states with the aim of neutralising them in the medium term. In Moscow, the view is gaining ground that the three Baltic states have failed the test of sovereignty, preferring to exchange it for the status of ‘junior partners’ in the West’s struggle against Russia. Therefore, a military-technical response to the current hostile actions of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius is bound to follow; it will not be long before it comes.”